Cross-country econometric analysis informed by Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory suggests that the concentration of Africa's exports on unprocessed primary products is caused largely by the region's combination of low levels of education and abundant natural resources. In some African countries, the share of manufactures in exports could be raised by improving infrastructure and policies. For most of Africa, however, the highest priority is to raise the absolute level of exports in all sectors, and particularly in sectors based on natural resources, following a development path more like that of land-abundant America than that of land-scarce Asia.
Introduction
Africa's exports are heavily concentrated on unprocessed primary products, in contrast to the exports of East Asia, which consist mainly of manufactures. It has often been suggested that this difference in export structure has contributed to the large difference between the growth rates of these two regions over the past few decades, and that if Africa were to adopt the same trade policies as East Asia, it too would experience rapid export-oriented industrialization. This paper, however, considers another explanation of Africa's distinctive export structure, which is that it arises from differences not in trade policies, but in supplies of human and natural resources. The structure of Africa's exports may thus just reflect the region's comparative advantage, which is likely to change only slowly over the next few decades, whatever policies are pursued.
Section I explains why and how the export structure of a country is influenced by its human and natural resources, both in theory and in practice. Section II compares Africa as a whole with other regions, asking how far the differences in export structure can be explained by differences in resource supplies. Section III asks the same question about all individual African countries, comparing what they actually export with what would be predicted from their resources. Section IV discusses the implications of the results for Africa's export prospects and policies. (A fuller analysis, with more details of the methods and data used, is in Wood and Mayer, 1998.) 
I. Influence of resources on export structure
That the composition of a country's exports is influenced by its resources is an old idea, and a simple one. The mixture of goods which people want to consume varies less among countries than the mixture of goods which their resources allow to be cheaply produced. Countries thus tend to export goods whose production makes intensive use of resources of which they have a relatively large supply, and conversely to import goods which require large inputs of resources that are locally scarce. This idea is the basis of Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) trade theory.
Theory
Some variants of H-O theory are based on implausibly strong assumptions, particularly that all countries are equally efficient, and that trade equalises wages and other factor prices among countries, so that all countries use exactly the same combination of resources to produce one unit of any good. However, the prediction of H-O theory that is relevant to the present paper, namely that the composition of a country's exports depends on the composition of its resources, requires only a much weaker and more plausible assumption, namely that in all countries the ranking of goods in terms of resource input combinations is similar -for example, that the land/labour input ratio in agriculture is always greater than in manufacturing.
H-O theory cannot provide a complete explanation of the pattern of trade: other forces are also important (and will be considered in this paper). Some differences in efficiency among countries are uneven among goods, and a country which was particularly efficient in producing a good would tend to export that good, even if the mixture of resource inputs required gave it no special advantage. A common cause of sectorally uneven differences in efficiency is economies of scale, which are especially important in explaining the large volume of trade that occurs among countries with similar resources, and in explaining the fine details of the composition of trade.
The pattern of trade is also affected by many sorts of government policies, including charges and restrictions on imports, and by transport costs and varying distances among countries.
Nonetheless, H-O theory provides a useful broad-brush explanation of some major features of the pattern of trade. In particular, recent research has found that it explains much of the variation among countries in the shares of manufactures, processed primary products and unprocessed primary products in their exports (Wood and Berge, 1997; Owens and Wood, 1997; Mayer, 1997) . H-O theory also explains North-South trade in manufactures, and in particular why developing countries export labour-intensive items to developed countries in exchange for imports of skill-intensive items (many studies are reviewed in Wood, 1994, ch. 3) . The resources whose varying supply among countries causes this variation in export composition are three broad ones: skill (or 'human capital', acquired through education and training), land (meaning natural resources of all sorts), and labour (the number of people in the workforce). By contrast with most other H-O models, capital (physical or financial) is omitted from this list of resources. The reason is that capital, though of vital importance as an input to production, is now highly mobile among countries, so that it cannot plausibly be regarded as a resource of which a large fixed 'endowment' gives some countries a comparative advantage in the production and export of capital-intensive goods. If a country has a comparative advantage in a good because of the abundance of a resource such as copper ore or educated labour, then it can usually obtain the capital needed to develop this resource, either from domestic savings or from abroad.
Moreover, because domestic capital markets are linked to international capital markets, the cost of capital is similar in most countries, so differences in capital intensity among sectors do not cause differences in comparative advantage among countries (Wood, 1994, pp. 32-40) . There are exceptions to these generalisations, particularly in developing countries, but they appear to be a good first approximation to the truth.
Both labour and skill are also internationally mobile to some extent. Only a small fraction of the world's labour force is able to move among countries, but for some individual countries such mobility is important (and the remittances of their mobile workers are an important 'export').
There is also a high degree of mobility among some of the world's most skilled workers: those with the experience, know-how and contacts needed to produce and sell goods on world markets, which is what exporting is all about. As with capital, the international mobility of highly-skilled workers means that their services can usually be obtained to develop the production of goods in which a country's resources give it a comparative advantage, reinforcing the H-O pattern of trade.
However, barriers to harnessing the skills of such workers -poor communications facilities or restrictions on direct foreign investment, for example -may impede the realisation of a resourcebased comparative advantage in particular countries and particular sectors (Wood, 1998) .
Econometric specification
The simplest of our models explains variation among countries in the share of manufactures in their exports as a consequence of variation in their relative supplies of only two of the three resources: skill and land. Manufacturing is more compact than agriculture, and needs a more educated labour force: as a consequence, it requires a much higher ratio of skill to land. Given this basic difference in the resource mixtures needed to produce manufactures and primary products, a country's comparative advantage as between these two sorts of goods depends heavily on its relative supplies of skill and land. Countries with high ratios of skill to land tend to export manufactures, while those with low ratios of skill to land tend to export primary products. This relationship is measured using a cross-country regression:
where X nm and X bp are (gross) exports of manufactures and primary products, h/n is the ratio of skill to land supplies, u is the error term, and the subscript i identifies the country. The skill/land ratio is expressed as skill per worker, h, over land per worker, n (with the per-worker denominators cancelling out). Both the export ratio and the resource ratio are converted into logarithms.
This simple skill-and-land-only model is a good approximation, but its omission of labour implicitly assumes that manufacturing and primary production are equally labour-intensive. To relax this assumption, and to bring all three resources into the model, the form of the regression needs to be slightly expanded, to:
in which the two resource ratios, h (skill/labour) and n (land/labour), are entered separately. We shall apply this specification also to the ratio of processed to unprocessed primary exports, but this particular export ratio is not much affected by cross-country variation in n. Both processed and unprocessed primary exports require large inputs of land, so that the main cause of variation in the ratio between them is variation in h: countries with more skill per worker tend to export higher ratios of processed to unprocessed primary products. A simple model for this export ratio, again involving only two of the three resources (skill and labour), is thus:
where X pp /X np is the ratio of processed to unprocessed primary exports. In all these models, to capture possible effects of economies of scale, we will also include a country size variable.
These models refer to (gross) exports, but similar models can be applied to net exports (exports minus imports), as in Owens and Wood, 1997, a specification which would be more appropriate if the aim were to test H-O theory (which focuses on net exports), rather than to analyse the export structure of a particular region. Both gross and net export specifications are at risk of 'contamination' by non-H-O influences: that is, the estimated coefficients on the resource variables may reflect not only pure resource-supply effects, but also other influences on trade whose variation among countries happens to be correlated with variation in resource supplies (for example, the composition of demand may vary with per capita income, which is correlated with skill per worker). Such contamination is more likely with gross than with net exports, because gross exports include all intra-industry trade, much of which is non-H-O in nature. However, the signs of the coefficients on the resource variables (which are usually the same for net exports as for gross exports) suggest that the dominant influence on them is the resource-supply effects described by H-O theory.
Resource measures
Skill per worker is measured by the average number of years of schooling of the adult (over-15) population, using data mainly from Barro and Lee, 1996 . The stock of skill in a country is thus its total number of person-years of schooling, obtained by multiplying average years of schooling by the number of adult inhabitants -the latter being our measure of the country's supply of labour (which we also use as our country size variable). We measure the supply of land -that is, the availability of natural resources in each country -by a country's total land area (with land per worker being total land area divided by adult population). Details of our data sources are provided in the appendix of Wood and Mayer, 1998 .
Total land area is clearly not an ideal measure of natural-resource availability, since it fails to allow for variation among countries in the quality of their land. But it is an unbiased measure, because what each country has, per square kilometre of its surface area, in terms of soil fertility, water resources, minerals, and so on, can be regarded as the outcome of a random draw. Nor is it easy to improve on this measure. In Wood and Mayer, 1998 , we added information on specific natural resources, such as arable land and oil reserves. This was helpful in explaining the composition of primary exports (for example, the division between agricultural and mineral products), but was not helpful as a measure of the quality of natural resources and thus in explaining the division of exports between manufactures and primary products.
Average years of schooling is likewise not an ideal measure of skill. It takes no account of cross-country differences in the quality of schooling -how much (and what) the student learned in the years concerned. Moreover, it neglects sources of skill acquisition other than schoolingboth formal classroom training and experience (or on-the-job training). These deficiencies cannot be remedied with currently available data. 1 For our statistical purposes they are less serious than they appear, because there is a strong cross-country correlation between years of schooling and these other aspects of skill: countries with longer schooling tend also to provide better quality schooling (Lee and Barro, 1997) and more training. In interpreting the results, however, it is important to bear in mind that it is not just length of schooling which matters.
All our resource availability measures are of relative quantities rather than relative prices, even though it is fundamentally the relative cheapness of abundant factors that gives a country a comparative advantage in goods that use them intensively. One reason for using quantity data is that H-O theory predicts that trade reduces (or even eliminates) inter-country differences in factor prices by raising the demand for abundant resources and reducing the demand for scarce ones, making prices in principle a less reliable indicator of the relative abundance of resources. Another, more practical reason is that relevant and comparable data on the prices of skill, land and labour do not exist for most countries.
Export categories
We first divide all (merchandise) exports into two broad categories -manufactured and primary. This definition is narrower than that used by production and employment statisticians, as will be explained below, and so we label this category NM (for 'narrow manufactures'). All other goods are classified by trade statisticians as primary products, and so we label our primary category BP (where B stands for 'broad').
We then further divide primary (BP) exports between processed and unprocessed items, by using the wider definition of manufacturing in the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), which includes also goods produced in factories which use large inputs of (usually local) raw materials: food, beverage and tobacco products, non-ferrous metals, sawn timber, tanned leather, pulp and paper, and refined petroleum. It is these items -which the ISIC classifies as
1 A feasible refinement of the skill measure is to consider not just average years of schooling, but the mix of different levels of schooling. However, we found than this refinement did not improve the results.
2 A few items in SITC 5-8 (other than 68) are classified as BP rather than NM, and parts of SITC 9 are added to NM: see Annex 1 of Wood and Mayer (1998) , in which NM is also split between skill-intensive and labour-intensive manufactures.
manufactures but the SITC as primary -that we define as processed primary products (PP), as is illustrated in figure 1. Our unprocessed primary products are those which the ISIC classifies (more narrowly than the SITC) as agricultural and mineral, namely goods in the state in which they leave the farm or the mine, and we label them NP (where N again stands for 'narrow'). 
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Figure 1: Export categories
Regression results Table 1 reports the results of cross-country regressions describing the relationships between export structure and resources. They refer to 1990 (the latest year for which all the variables are currently available) and cover 111 countries -all those with populations over one million for which data are available. 4 The first four regressions in the table focus on two aspects of export structure -the ratios NM/BP and PP/NP defined above -in each case using both a 'full' specification and a simplified specification. (The lower part of the table is discussed later.) Notes: Dependent variables are export ratios. NM = narrow manufactures; BP = broad primary (BP = PP + NP); PP = processed primary products; NP = unprocessed primary products; h = skill per worker (average adult years of schooling); n = land per worker (square kilometres per adult); p = total adult population (thousands). All variables are expressed in natural logarithms. t-statistics in brackets. 111 countries in all regressions, of which 37 African.
Regression (1) shows that variation across countries in their manufactured/primary export (NM/BP) ratios is quite well explained simply by variation in their skill/land ratios, but regression (2) improves the explanation by separating the skill/land ratio into two separate resource ratios (skill/labour and land/labour) and adding a country size variable. The ratio of manufactured to primary exports tends to be higher in countries which have more skill per worker and less land per worker, and which are bigger. This last effect is probably the result of external economies:
a larger manufacturing sector makes it economic to develop more specialised support services, training and infrastructure, from which all firms in a country benefit.
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The second pair of regressions explains cross-country variation in the ratio of processed to unprocessed primary exports. In the full specification (4), the largest and statistically most significant coefficient, by far, is that on h: countries with higher levels of skill per worker tend to export more of their primary products in processed form. The coefficient on n is negative, because inputs of natural resources are a smaller share of the cost of processed than of unprocessed items, but is small and statistically insignificant. So is the positive coefficient on country size, suggesting that there are few sectoral economies of scale in primary processing.
Thus the simplified specification (3), with h as the sole explanatory variable, fits the data almost as well as the full specification.
All these regressions leave half or more of the cross-country variation in export structure unexplained. Measurement errors in our trade and resource data account for part of this shortfall, but part of it must be due to variation in systematic influences, including trade and other policies.
Extensive experiments with trade policy measures as additional independent variables in these and similar regressions achieved little improvement in their explanatory power (Wood and Berge, 1997, pp. 49-53; Wood and Mayer, 1998, annex 4) . Nor have we been able to find any other variables whose inclusion substantially improves their explanatory power -tests of infrastructure variables are reported in Zappia (1995) , and of foreign direct investment in Greenhill (1999) .
However, the export structures of individual countries and regions are bound to be affected by policies and other variables which are not included in our regressions, and this will be recognised in the application of our results below.
II. Comparison of Africa with other regions
The previous section explained and described the relationships which exist between a country's export structure and its human and natural resources, using a data set which covers all the countries in the world. The rest of the paper will use these relationships to analyse the export structure of Africa. We shall study African countries individually in section III, but first, in this section, we shall look at Africa as a whole, and compare it with other developing regions, using (unweighted) averages across all the countries in each region. We shall also ask whether the worldwide relationships which we found in the previous section are valid for Africa, or whether there are significant differences between African and non-African countries.
The analysis in this section will distinguish seven groups of countries, in addition to Africa . Africa is one of the two most land-abundant regions, the other being MENA. It is also one of the two least skill-abundant regions, the other being South Asia. Africa thus has a unique combination of low skill and high land, and an exceptionally low skill/land ratio (which is The influence of these differences in regional resources on regional export structures is shown in figures 4a and 4b. Each figure combines an estimated relationship across all individual countries (the cross-country regression line) with the actual average values of the dependent and independent variables for the eight country groups. Figure 4a focuses on the ratio between manufactured and primary exports, using the simplified specification of equation (1), whose results are reported in regression (1) of table 1. The figure shows that Africa's low skill/land ratio explains well why its ratio of manufactured to primary exports is lower than those of all other regions. However, Africa's data point lies below the regression line, indicating that the actual share of manufactures in its exports is even less than its low predicted share (an aspect which will be investigated more thoroughly in section III). Figure 4b focuses on the ratio between processed and unprocessed primary exports, which it relates to the level of skill per worker (using the simplified specification of equation (3) and regression (3) in table 1). It confirms that country groups with high skill per worker (such as the developed countries) process a large proportion of their primary exports, while those with lower skill per worker process smaller proportions. Africa's low ratio of processed to unprocessed primary exports is well explained by its low skill level.
on its resources relative to those of other regions now.
Significant differences between Africa and other regions have been found in cross-country analyses of economic growth (e.g. Levine and Renelt, 1992; Easterly and Levine, 1997) . To see whether such differences exist also for exports, we add dummy variables to the regressions, allowing the intercept and the h, n and p slopes to differ between Africa and all other countries.
The results, reported in the lower part of Table 1, show that there are no significant differences between Africa and the rest of the world in the processed/unprocessed primary export regression, but that there are some differences in the manufactured/primary export regression.
The h dummy variable coefficient in line 5b is insignificant, indicating that a higher level of skill raises the share of manufactures in exports to the same degree within Africa as among nonAfrican countries. However, the h coefficient in line 5a, which refers to non-African countries (and is of roughly the same size for African countries) is about 30% lower than that in the pooled regression (line 2). By contrast, the n coefficient in the non-African regression in line 5a is only about 10% more negative than that in the pooled regression, but the n dummy coefficient in line 5b is significant and positive, indicating that there is less difference in manufactured export ratios between high-n and low-n countries within Africa than elsewhere. (We shall see in section III that this is because several low-n African countries have unusually few manufactured exports.) The pattern of the p coefficients resembles that of the n coefficients, with little difference between the non-African and pooled regressions, and variation in country size having less effect within Africa than elswhere (though not significantly so).
In summary, we have established in this section that Africa's unusual export structure (its low share of manufactures, and the low share of processed products in its primary exports) is clearly and strongly related to its unusual combination of human and natural resources (a low level of skill per worker and a high level of land per worker). However, we have also found that Africa on average has an even smaller share of manufactures in its exports than would be predicted from its resources, and that within Africa low levels of land per worker appear to have a less favourable effect on the manufactured export share than in other parts of the world.
III. Exports and resources of individual African countries
In the previous section, we analysed the situation of Africa as a whole, relative to other groups of countries. This section looks at all the individual African countries, asking essentially the same questions as in the previous section: about the composition of their exports, about their combinations of human and natural resources, and about the connections between their export structures and their resources. This last question will be addressed by comparing each country's actual export structure with the structure predicted from its resources on the basis of the crosscountry relationships discussed and estimated in section I.
The data used in this section differ in one respect from those in the previous two sections, namely that the exports of the South African Customs Union (SACU) are disaggregated to show separately Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland, using information from the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Limited. 8 The sources and definitions involved are somewhat different from those of the standard UN data used in our regressions (in which SACU is treated as a proxy for South Africa). This change in the data also means that the average values for Africa in the tables in this section differ slightly from those in the figures in section II.
Variation in export structure and resources
The export composition of the 40 African countries in our data set is shown in figure 5 (and in the first two columns of table 2). There is wide dispersion in the share of manufactured exports across African countries, around a low average. Thus the share of manufactures in exports is less than 10 per cent for three-quarters of the countries, and under 5 per cent for half of them, but for one country -Mauritius -it is over 60 per cent. Five other countries have manufactured export shares in excess of 20 percent, but only for Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe are these shares credible (the data for Liberia and Mozambique are unreliable).
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The share of processed products in primary exports also varies widely around a low average. For only 13 countries is this share above 20 per cent, although in Swaziland and Zambia it is over 90 per cent. Figure 5 also shows that the split of countries' primary exports between processed and unprocessed items is unrelated to that between manufactured and primary exports: 8 We did not separate out Lesotho, the other member of SACU, because its economy seems too closely integrated with that of South Africa (by which it is surrounded) for its export structure to be meaningfully related to its resources. 9 For some African countries, the shares of manufactured exports in figure 5 and table 2 are much lower than in other standard sources (with which our data are compared in Wood and Mayer, 1998, annex 2) . For example, we show the manufactured export share of the Central African Republic as 2 percent, whereas the World Development Report puts it at 48 percent. The reason for these discrepancies is that we have classified certain items as primary products which other sources classify (we think misleadingly) as manufactures -particularly gold and uncut precious stones, but also some natural-resource-based chemicals.
as one moves from left to right, the share of manufactures is falling, but there is no pattern in the share of processing. Table 2 contains information on the human and natural resources of individual African countries -the values of our variables h, n and p -which again reveals wide dispersion around the African regional averages. The accuracy of the skill data for many countries is doubtful.
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But at face value, they imply that the adult population of four countries has an average of less than one year of schooling (Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mozambique and Niger), and that of three 
Actual and predicted export structures
In section II, we showed that Africa's average export structure is well explained by its average combination of human and natural resources. Is the same true of African countries individually?
To answer this question, we use the regressions estimated in section I to predict the export structure of each country, and compare this prediction with its actual export structure. Our preferred predictions are based on regressions which exclude African countries (roughly one-third of all the countries in our data set): the coefficients of these regressions are the same as those of the dummy variable regressions in rows (5a) and (6a) human and natural resources, on the basis of the relationships between exports and resources in non-African countries. However, as a check on these predictions, we made two alternative sets, one based on the all-country regressions in rows (2) and (4) of table 1, the other on regressions covering non-African developing countries (that is, also excluding developed countries). shows the predicted share of manufactured exports to be 20 per cent or more for 11 African countries, and 30 per cent or more for five of them. Its third column shows the discrepancies between actual and predicted shares: 30 out of 40 numbers are negative, meaning that the actual share of manufactured exports is less than the predicted share, and in 13 cases they exceed -10 percentage points. The average discrepancy is -5.5 points (or -7.3 points without Liberia and Mozambique), which confirms the conclusion of section II that Africa as a whole exports an even smaller share of manufactures than would be predicted from its resources.
These data also shed light on another finding of section II, namely the smaller difference in manufactured export shares between low-n and high-n countries within Africa than in the rest of the world. This feature (of rows 5a and 5b in table 1) is exposed in table 3 because the predictions are based on a regression which excludes African countries. It corresponds closely with the large negative proportional discrepancies in eight African countries with low levels of land per worker (Burundi, the Gambia, Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Uganda, all with under 4 km 2 per 100 workers, in the 'Asian' range). The absolute discrepancies shown in table 3 are also large in all eight of these countries, averaging -22 percentage points.
11
By contrast, the average absolute discrepancy for the eight highest-n countries is about +1 percentage point. Thus the smaller effect of variation in n on manufactured export shares within Africa than elsewhere is a reflection not of unusually high shares in land-abundant African countries but of unusually low shares in land-scarce African countries.
Columns 4-6 of Table 3 compare predicted and actual shares of processed items in primary exports. There is more variation in actual than in predicted shares, partly because the dividing line between processed and unprocessed is particularly arbitrary for the sorts of primary products in which Africa specialises, namely minerals and tree crops. Unlike manufactures, moreover, there is no general tendency for the predicted shares to exceed the actual shares: in the last column about half the numbers are positive and half are negative. There are also fewer large discrepancies than with the manufactured export shares: 28 out of 40 are less than 10 percentage points in absolute size. However, in Senegal, Swaziland, Zaire and Zambia, the actual shares vastly exceed the predicted shares. The actual share of processed items exceeds the predicted share to a substantial extent also in Namibia, while it falls substantially short in Mauritius.
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Use of our two alternative prediction methods (the results of which are available on request) has little effect on the processed share of primary exports, but more effect on manufactured export
shares. With the all-country coefficients, the predicted shares for all African countries are lower, mainly because the intercept is lower, so that Africa's performance looks 'better', as expected, since the comparison is now partly with Africa itself. The changes are biggest for countries with little land per worker: this is because, in the all-country regression, the negative n-coefficient is slightly smaller, tending to raise the predicted share of countries with high land per worker. (In effect, in the non-Africa regression, the predictions for low-n African countries are pulled up by South Asian countries with similar h and n but much higher manufactured export shares.) With the non-African-developing-country coefficients, the predicted manufactured export shares are higher for most African countries (so that their performance looks 'worse'), but are lower for the minority with relatively high skill per worker. This is because the omission of developed countries raises the intercept and greatly reduces the coefficient on h, raising predicted shares for lesseducated countries, but lowering predicted shares for more-educated countries.
Causes of variation in manufactured export share discrepancies
As can be seen in table 3, the size of the discrepancies between actual and predicted export shares varies widely among African countries. Much of this variation undoubtedly arises from inaccuracies of the data on exports and on resources, which are compounded in the discrepancies, but insofar as the variation is 'real', it is important to consider its causes, particularly in assessing export prospects and policies. We therefore looked for correlations across African countries between the manufactured export share discrepancies and variables which proxy the reasons suggested in other studies for Africa's low manufactured exports: unfavourable geography, poor infrastructure, weak policies and institutions, and high risk -lack of education, another frequently suggested reason, being already embedded in our regressions. (A similar analysis of the processed primary export share discrepancies is reported in Wood and Mayer, 1998, section IIID.) For this purpose, we used the set of African countries listed in tables 2 and 3, but omitting Liberia and Mozambique, whose large positive discrepancies are probably due to inaccuracies in their export data. (We also experimented with omitting Mauritius, which is not a typical African country, and has the highest manufactured export share in the region, but we discovered that its inclusion has little effect on the results.) We applied two different tests. One was to calculate the coefficients of correlation (R) across our 38 countries between the explanatory variables and the size of the proportional discrepancies, measuring the latter as the natural logarithm of the actual/predicted export share ratio. 13 The results are reported in the first column of table 4, with correlations in the 'wrong' direction being indicated by square brackets (statistical significance at the 10% level or better requires an absolute value of 0.27 or above).
These correlations may be weakened or obscured by the inclusion of countries with very low predicted manufactured export shares (which in ten cases are under 5 per cent). We thus also applied a second test, in which the data set was confined to African countries with substantial the final column gives the result of a t-test of the hypothesis that these means are the same (the lower the number, the more significant is the difference between them), with differences in the wrong direction again being indicated by square brackets.
Panel A of table 4 contains 'geographical' explanatory variables. The first is whether or not a country is landlocked, which is often mentioned as an obstacle to the trade of a large minority of African countries, and might more adversely affect manufactured than primary exports because the former depend more on imported inputs (Collier, 1997; Bloom and Sachs, 1998) . Our results provide little support for this hypothesis: the correlation in column one is close to zero, one of th e four good performers is landlocked (Zimbabwe) and half of the poor performers are coastal, so unprocessed mineral or unprocessed static agricultural products. 13 The results of this test are similar but somewhat weaker using unlogged proportional and absolute discrepancies, and are also similar using the discrepancies generated by our two alternative prediction methods. The impression gained from these simple correlations is not materially altered by combining them in multiple regressions. Note: Predicted values are based on non-Africa regression, as in table 3: 'logged proportional discrepancy' is the natural log of the actual/predicted export share. Square brackets around an R-value or a P-value indicate that the direction of the relationship is contrary to expectations. 'Good performers' group contains 4 countries and 'poor performers' group contains 8 countries, except where superscripted as follows: a = 2 countries, b = 3 countries, c = 4 countries, d = 5 countries, e = 6 countries, f = 7 countries.
Sources: panels A-C, see text and Wood and Mayer (1998, appendix) ; panel D, International Country Risk Guide (lines 1-4) and Euromoney magazine (line 5). that the difference in means in the last column, though in the right direction, is insignificant.
(These results are of course consistent with the more general proposition that being landlocked is a disadvantage for both primary and manufactured exports.)
The other three geographical variables are measures of natural resource quality -arable land share, water availability and mineral reserves -higher values of which should in principle tend to depress manufactured export shares. The negative correlations in column one for arable land and water availability give some support to this hypothesis, but there is no correlation with mineral reserves (although the data involved have some obvious defects, discussed in Mayer and Wood, 1998) . The average arable land share is also lower for the good than for the poor performers, and would be significantly so if Mauritius were excluded from the former group. By contrast, water availability is greater for the good than for the poor performers (although again the exclusion of Mauritius would cause the difference to be in the right direction and significant). Mineral reserves are also greater for the good performers than for the poor performers, though the difference is not significant because of the wide variation within each group.
Panel B of table 4 contains three measures of the availability of infrastructure: the number of telephone lines per worker, electricity generating capacity per worker, and paved road length per worker (determinants of manufactured exports emphasised by, for example, Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Collier and Gunning, 1999; Elbadawi, 1999; Elbadawi et al., 1999) . Although primary exports, too, require infrastructure, our results give quite strong support to the hypothesis that inadequate infrastructure is particularly deleterious to manufactured exports. All three of the correlation coefficients in column one are in the right direction and two of them are statistically significant or almost so. Similarly, all three of the differences of means between good and poor performers are in the right direction and reasonably significant.
Infrastructure is of course one sort of physical capital, an input to production which was omitted from the regressions on which our predictions are based. It is thus in principle possible that variation in manufactured export share discrepancies among African countries is in part due to variation in the degree to which they are integrated with world capital markets (and in internal influences on interest rates). 14 In particular, if manufacturing were more capital-intensive than primary production, countries with higher interest rates would be at a comparative disadvantage in manufacturing and hence would tend to have larger negative discrepancies. We were unable to test this hypothesis, for lack of data on the long-term cost of capital in each country, but on the basis of casual empiricism, it does not seem promising: for example, it is hard to believe that Côte d'Ivoire is falling further short of achieving its manufactured export potential than Guinea-Bissau because of a persistently higher real interest rate. Moreover, Africa's largest primary exportsminerals and tree crops -are as capital-intensive as many sorts of manufacturing, so that differences in interest rates, even if large, might not much affect the relative extent of primary and manufactured exports.
Panel C of the table contains several measures of trade and exchange rate policies. The first is the OPEN measure of Sachs and Warner (1995) , which combines several specific indicators, including the black market exchange rate premium: both the correlation in the first column and the difference of means in the last three columns support, albeit weakly, the hypothesis that less openness, measured in this way, adversely affects the share of manufactures in exports. The same is true, but more strongly so, of the price distortion index of Dollar (1992) , which also captures the effects of both trade policy and exchange rate policy. The next row shows a similarly strong adverse effect of the average black-market exchange rate premium during 1977-88 (from Cowitt, various years) -misalignment of the exchange rate being an influence on manufactured exports emphasised by, for example, Elbadawi (1999) .
In testing the influence of trade policy, it is in principle more relevant to use indicators of bias against manufactured exports in particular rather than against exports in general. We thus constructed variables (more precisely defined in Wood and Mayer, 1998) and Bloom, 1998; Collier and Gunning, 1999; Freeman and Lindauer, 1999; . The results in the first row strongly suggest that a low-quality bureaucracy tends to reduce the share of manufactures in exports: this emerges both from the cross-country correlation and from the comparison between good and poor performers. Corruption and absence of the rule of law also apparently tend to reduce the share of manufactured exports, though the results are weaker, particularly for the comparison between good and poor performers. The last two rows of this panel refer to two indicators of country risk: the correlations in the first column are low, but there is a clear difference between good and poor performers, with the former being perceived as significantly less risky than the latter.
The results in table 4 shed some light on the reasons for the unusually small difference in that a larger share (37%) of the region's financial capital is held abroad than of any other region.
manufactured export shares between high-n and low-n African countries identified earlier, which is a reflection mainly of large negative discrepancies in eight low-n countries. Six of these eight countries are also in our group of eight 'poor performers' (the Gambia and Sierra Leone are subtracted and Ethiopia and Togo, both also with low n, are added). This suggests that the main reason why low-n countries in Africa underperform by comparison with high-n countries is not that they have worse infrastructure, policies and institutions, but that unfavourable infrastructure, policies and institutions common to low-n and high-n countries do more damage to manufactured exports where these exports are potentially larger, namely in the low-n countries.
In summary, variation among African countries in the discrepancies between their actual manufactured export shares and the shares predicted from their resources is clearly influenced by most of the forces which other economists have suggested as explanations for the region's low manufactured exports. Geography and the sectoral bias of trade policies seem to have little effect, but lack of infrastructure, macroeconomic mismanagement (particularly of the exchange rate), ineffective administration, and external perceptions of risk all appear to cause shortfalls of actual below predicted manufactured export shares. There is thus an important overlap between our results and those of other studies, particularly in respect of implications for policy. For example, we agree with Collier (1997) that manufacturing is a more 'transactions-intensive' sector than primary production, that Africa's manufactured exports are reduced by unsually high transactions costs, and that policy reform and infrastructural investment to reduce these costs are vital. But there is also, of course, an important difference between our results and those of other studies, which is that we conclude that the share of manufactures in Africa's exports is low mainly because of an unusual combination of resource endowments, and that poor policies and infrastructure are a second-order influence, rather than the main cause, as other economists have argued.
IV. Prospects and policies
Africa's exports, by comparison with those of other developing countries, are unusually concentrated on primary products, particularly unprocessed ones. In other words, the shares of manufactures in its total exports and of processed items in its primary exports are both unusually small. The analysis in this paper has shown that these unusual features of Africa's export structure Looking ahead, our analysis suggests that the distinctive structure of Africa's exports is unlikely to change rapidly. Africa's average level of education will and should continue to rise, but so will the average levels of education of the other developing regions. Similarly, population growth will continue to lower the amount of land per worker both in Africa and in other regions.
Thus its relative position in the world's constellation of human and natural resources, which is what determines Africa's comparative advantage as an exporter, and which has not changed much over the past 30 years, will probably not change radically over the next 30 years, either. There is, as already mentioned, considerable scope for raising the share of manufactures in the exports of some African countries, but the majority of the countries in the region are likely to remain, for a long time to come, exporters predominantly of primary products.
Our projection of Africa's future export structure differs greatly from that of Bloom and Sachs (1998, pp. 267-8) African countries are exporting a somewhat smaller share of manufactures than we predict, not a larger share, as would be expected if their natural resources were of unusually low quality. This is probably because the unusually poor quality of Africa's land for agricultural purposes is offset by an unusually rich endowment of minerals, and because Africa's tropical climate and diseases adversely affect all production, including manufacturing, not just primary production.
Our projection of Africa's future export structure differs also from that of Collier (1997 Collier ( , 1998 , who argues that, with better policies and infrastructure, manufactured export shares in most of Africa could match those of Asian countries. His main reason for arguing this, and for disputing our conclusions, is that Africa's low growth has reduced wages in the region below those in Asia, making African manufactured exports competitive. It is in fact not clear that wages in African manufacturing are currently lower, at official exchange rates, than those of countries such as Bangladesh and China. More importantly, comparative advantage depends not on the price of any single factor, such as labour, but on relative factor prices -and our analysis shows that what mainly determines the share of manufactures in exports is the relative price of skill and land. 15 The price of labour is of less importance, and the direction of its effect is ambiguous: low wages tend to make a country more competitive in all sectors, and whether this promotes manufactured exports more than primary exports depends on whether labour accounts for a larger share of total cost in manufacturing than in primary production, or vice versa, which varies, depending on the particular sorts of manufacturing and primary production concerned.
A crucial limitation of the preceding analysis of Africa's export prospects is that it focuses on the composition of exports, and neglects the absolute level of exports. No less striking than the high share of primary products in Africa's total exports is the smallness of the total: in 1995, the entire region's merchandise exports were roughly equal to those of Malaysia, a country with a population of 20 million, compared to Africa's more than 550 million (World Bank, 1998, indicators tables 1 and 15). Africa's share of world exports has fallen from over 4 per cent in 1950 to under 2 per cent. 16 This has been a consequence both of declines in Africa's shares of world markets for its main export products and of these products being of declining relative importance in world trade (Ng and Yeats, 1997) . The latter trend was not due simply to Africa's dependence on primary exports: between 1962/4 and 1991/3, Latin America's exports, which are mainly primary, grew nearly twice as fast as those of Africa (ibid, table 3).
Nor is the low level of Africa's exports due to the region exporting an unusually small proportion of its output: allowing for differences in size and income level, export/GDP ratios in Africa are, on average, similar to those of other countries, though they vary widely among African countries (Wood, 1996, table 7.1; Rodrik, 1999, p. 113) . The smallness and slow growth of Africa's exports are, instead, a reflection of the smallness and slow growth of the region's aggregate output, with causality in both directions (low exports reducing output and low output reducing exports) . The key question about the future both of Africa's exports and of Africa's output is thus how to bring about a very large increase in their overall levels.
In the minority of African countries with manufactured export shares now well below their predicted values, growth of manufactured exports could make a large contribution to growth of their total exports. Moreover, in the majority of African countries, whose current manufactured export shares are in line with our predictions, exports of manufactures could grow as fast as exports of primary products -which in some cases might be very rapidly. 17 However, even in the currently 'underperforming' African countries, the predicted share of manufactures in exports is on average less than 30% -similar to the 28% average share in Latin America, and well below the 60-70% average shares in East and South Asia (figure 2) -and achievement of our predicted shares in all countries would raise Africa's average share only from 10% to 15% (table 3) .
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, expansion of education in other regions means that African countries, even if they raise their levels of education substantially, will experience only a modest shift of their comparative advantage towards manufactures.
Thus if large rises in the absolute levels of Africa's exports and output are to be achieved over the next few decades, they must be achieved mainly through expansion of natural-resourcebased activities. 18 Our results suggest that there is not, on average, much scope at present for raising the share of processed items in Africa's primary exports 19 : what is needed is rapid growth of both processed and unprocessed primary exports, at roughly similar rates. This vision of Africa's exporting future raises two questions: do the region's natural resources have the potential to produce vastly more output; and could this output be sold at remunerative prices on world markets? The available evidence suggests to us that the answer to both questions is 'yes'.
It is widely agreed that Africa has the potential for greatly increased output of many sorts of minerals, which could be realised through improvement of infrastructure and policies (World Bank, 1992; Gooding, 1998 ). Africa's agricultural potential is more controversial, because of its tropical climate (Bloom and Sachs, 1998) and the poor quality of much of its soil (FAO, 1986a, p. 13) . However, the total land area is vast, and only a quarter of Africa's potentially cultivable land is actually cultivated (FAO, 1986b, p. 52) . The irrigated area could be more than doubled, albeit expensively, and there is much scope for increasing the use of fertiliser and improved seed varieties, albeit not so generally as in South Asia (FAO, 1986a, pp. 13-14) . Moreover, outside Africa tropical climates have not prevented the achievement of far higher levels of agricultural output and exports in much of Latin America and in Southeast Asia, to which Africa has lost world market shares in tropical products (e.g. World Bank, 1996, p. 54; Udry, 1998) . Thus despite all the difficulties which beset African agriculture, there is reason to suppose that large increases in agricultural output could be supported by the region's natural resources.
Slow growth of world demand for primary products is unlikely to constrain the expansion of Africa's exports, for three reasons. One is that Africa's current share of the world market for all but a few products is so small that growth of its exports could greatly exceed growth of world demand without much disruption of other producers. The second reason is that demand for many agricultural products -for example, meat, seafood, vegetable oils, fruits and vegetables -has grown rapidly, and will continue to do so, even though demand for 'traditional' agricultural products -for example, tea and coffee -has grown slowly (Jaffee and Gordon, 1993) . If Africa can diversify from the latter sorts of products into the former, as Latin America has done, and as Kenya and Zimbabwe have begun to do, its market prospects will be transformed. The third reason for optimism is the prospect of continued rapid growth of the natural-resource-poor Asian countries, particularly large ones such as China (and, in the future, India), which will raise world few natural resources and a remote location (for example, Burkina Faso: Collier, 1997) . 19 The Africa point in figure 4b is close to the regression line. The calculations reported in table 3 suggest that on average Africa is exporting slightly more than its predicted share of processed primary products. demand for primary exports, including traditional agricultural products and minerals.
The main conclusion of this paper about Africa's export prospects may strike some readers as pessimistic. That the comparative advantage of most African countries is (and will remain for a long time) in primary products, rather than in manufactures, by contrast with the comparative advantage of most Asian countries, could be construed to mean that Africa has less chance than Asia of achieving a high level of development -above all, because developmental success in East Asia has been associated with the export of manufactures. We believe that this inference would be incorrect. Africa's comparative advantage in primary exports, which arises basically from its abundance of natural resources, is in our view at worst neutral, and quite possibly favourable, to its long-term development prospects, as compared with those of Asia.
Exporting manufactures is no longer a barometer of national prosperity. Both developed and developing countries now export manufactures on a large scale, but the skill-intensive highvalue activities are located in developed countries, and the labour-intensive low-value activities in developing countries. Being an exporter of labour-intensive manufactures, moreover, is not inherently attractive: prices are low, wages are low, and employment is insecure, since firms can easily move to another country -and all these problems are being aggravated by the entry of ever more countries into the world market for labour-intensive products (Kaplinsky, 1993) . For those with few natural resources, however, producing labour-intensive manufactures for export is better than scratching a subsistence living from the soil.
From an economic point of view, it is more attractive to have abundant natural resources, both as a source of income (since they generate more revenue for less work) and as a basis for the initial stages of development (since they provide a rent which can be invested in the accumulation of skills and physical capital). Moreover, if a high level of skill per worker is achieved, through education and learning from experience, the skill/land ratio even of a land-abundant country can rise to the point where its comparative advantage shifts into manufactures and services -although in absolute terms its primary production will remain large, and indeed continue to grow (as for instance in the United States). The most serious problems of natural-resource-based development are not economic, but political, and in particular that resource rents are often appropriated by social or political elites with little interest in broad-based development of their countries (Lal and Myint, 1996) . Political problems of this sort have acutely afflicted many African countries, but in principle they can be solved, and in practice there are welcome signs of progress.
One general implication of our analysis is thus that, in seeking lessons from experience elsewhere, those concerned with the economic future of Africa should pay more attention to the experience of America than has so far been the case, and less attention, at least in a relative sense, to the experience of Asia. There are valuable lessons to be learned from the experience of the East Asian NICs, including the importance of education, of economic contacts with the rest of the world, and of well-conceived and well-implemented industrial policies. But in terms of the specific structure of its exports and its production, Africa could not possibly follow the same path as East Asia, which has a very different combination of human and natural resources. The longterm model for African development is not Japan but the United States, and Africa's medium-term trajectory should take it in the direction not of the East Asian NICs, but of Latin America.
20 Latin
America's economic performance is often criticised, but if Africa's average per capita income were even half of Latin America's, it would be three times greater than it now is.
The greater prosperity of Latin America than of Africa is due in part to the higher skill level of its labour force. Raising the skill level of Africa's workers is thus crucial, but will require stimulation of the demand for skills as well as measures to increase their supply. More and better classrooms and teachers are necessary, but will achieve little if parents do not bother to send their children to school or firms to send their workers for training. Moreover, the low returns to Africa's low supply of education (Bennell, 1996; Collier and Gunning, 1999, pp. 84, 88 ) strongly suggest a lack of demand. There are many reasons for the low demand for skills in Africa, but one is the concentration of its exports on goods of low skill-intensity, particularly traditional unprocessed primary products. In this regard, Africa is trapped in a vicious circle: its lack of skilled workers causes it to specialise in exports which do not require skills, which in turn reduces the demand for skills and discourages people, firms and governments from expanding the skill supply (Wood and Ridao-Cano, 1999 ).
To escape, Africa must get into a virtuous circle of mutually reinforcing increases in both the supply of and the demand for skills. This is one of the lessons from the experience of East Asian countries such as Korea, whose rapid skill accumulation was achieved by expansion of the education system in conjunction with a step-by-step upgrading of the skill intensity of industrial activities, which not only raised the demand for educated labour but also provided the training and experience needed to realise the economic potential of educated workers. The difference is that, in Africa, this upward spiral needs to occur mainly not in manufacturing but in primary sectors, which is where lessons can be learned from Latin America and other natural-resource-abundant countries. It will require investment in infrastructure and active promotion of research, training, and business contacts with the rest of the world (discussed more fully in Wood and Mayer, 1998, section IVC) . Active microeconomic policies of these sorts will not only raise the level of primary exports -by diversification of product mix and improvement of production and marketing methods -but will also stimulate the demand for skilled workers.
